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abroad which enhances the immigrant's earnings potential back home. For the last 
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Abstract
In this paper we discuss forms of migration that are non-permanent. We focus
on temporary migrations where the decision to return is taken by the immigrant.
These migrations are likely to be frequent, and we provide some evidence for the
UK. We then develop a simple model which rationalizes the decision of a migrant
to return to his home country, despite a persistently higher wage in the host coun-
try. We consider three motives for a temporary migration: Di®erences in relative
prices in host- and home country, complementarities between consumption and
the location where consumption takes place, and the possibility of accumulating
human capital abroad which enhances the immigrant's earnings potential back
home. For the last return motive, we discuss extensions which allow for immi-
grant heterogeneity, and develop implications for selective in- and out- migration.
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Much of the theoretical and empirical literature on the economics of migration views migra-
tions as permanent. This is a convenient assumption and facilitates analysis in many areas,
like immigrant behavior, and the impact of migration on residents' outcomes. We argue in
this paper that many (and perhaps the majority) of migrations are temporary rather than
permanent. This may result in misleading conclusions in analysis which assumes migrations as
permanent. One reason is selective out-migration, which may lead to misleading conclusions
about economic performance of entry cohorts. Borjas (1985, 1987) shows that immigrants
may be non-randomly drawn from the skill distribution in their home countries, and that
this has important implications for studying immigrants' earnings assimilation. Similarly,
out-migration may again be selective (see Borjas and Bratsberg 1996). This in turn may
have important consequences for the estimation of performance pro¯les of immigrants.1
A further reason is that assuming permanency neglects an important source of variation
explaining heterogeneity in behavior across immigrants. For instance, when studying human
capital investment of individuals and its derivatives (like earnings functions), the literature
usually neglects macro conditions, as these are the same for all agents in a particular country.
However, when considering immigrants, and if migrations are temporary, this assumption is
not valid: Current decisions of immigrants who plan to return to their home countries (for
instance on human capital investments) will be based not only on immediate and future cir-
cumstances in the host economy, but also on expected future returns in the country of origin.
Both these reasons add considerable complexity to modeling the behaviour of immigrants,
and introduces di®erences in behaviour between immigrants and natives who are otherwise
identical, as well as between (otherwise identical) immigrants of di®erent origin but with
di®erent migration durations.
We believe that distinction between permanent and temporary migration is key for under-
standing many aspects of immigrant behaviour. We commence by providing some discussion
and de¯nition on some of the forms of migration that are frequent. We then provide evidence
for the temporary nature of migrations, and we choose the UK as an example. Based on data
1Papers like Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985) and for the US, Baker and Benjamin (1994)
for Canada, Friedberg (2000) for Israel, Bell (1997) and Chiswick (1980) for the UK and Barth
et al. (2004) for Norway all implicitly assume migrations as permanent.
1from the labour force survey, we illustrate that many migrants return back home, and this
happens mainly during the ¯rst half decade of being in the host country. We also show that
return propensities di®er across di®erent immigrant communities, and between immigrants
of di®erent ethnicities. We then model a number of reasons for why immigrants may want to
return back home in the simplest possible model. We then illustrate how this simple model
can be extended, by introducing heterogeneity across immigrants, and how such a framework
helps understanding selective in- and out-migration. We conclude with a discussion as to
how consideration of return migrations can explain various aspects of immigrant behaviour.
2 Forms of Migration
Migrations may take many di®erent forms. A rough classi¯cation of forms of migrations is pro-
vided in Figure 1. In the ¯gure, we have drawn a ¯rst distinction between economic motives
for migration, and motives related to natural disaster or persecution. Throughout human
history, these are the two main reasons for why individuals migrate. Receiving countries to-
day draw distinction between migrations that are due to these two di®erent motivations, and
have di®erent arrangements in place for refugees (or asylum seekers) and economic migrants.
Migrations that are due to economic motives may again take di®erent forms, and in
the ¯gure, we distinguish on the next level between temporary migrations and permanent
migrations. We draw this categorisation from the perspective of the receiving country: a
migrant is a temporary migrant if he/she stays in a particular country for a limited period
of time.2 At the same time, the migration may be permanent from the perspective of the
immigrant - she may leave the home country permanently, but remain temporarily in any
one host country.
Temporary migration may again be sub classi¯ed. One important type of temporary
migration is circulatory migration. With circulatory migration, migrant workers move fre-
quently between the host- and the source country. They only stay for a short period in the
receiving country, for example, for the harvest season. Circulatory migration is often induced
by a seasonal excess demand for labour in the immigration country, which can not be supplied
2For many aspects of analysis of immigrant behaviour, it is convenient to de¯ne a migration
as temporary if the migrant leaves the country before reaching retirement age.
2by the native work force at adequate prices. In Europe, an example of circulatory migrations
is harvest workers from Eastern Europe to Germany, or from Northern Africa to Southern
Italy.
A transient migration describes a situation where the migrant moves across di®erent host
countries before possibly reaching a ¯nal destination. Transient migrations were frequent
during the 1960's and 1970's, where migrants from Southern European countries moved
between Northern European countries. More recently, an increasing number of (often illegal)
immigrants from Africa or Asia enter Europe through Italy, Spain or Portugal and then move
to Northern countries like Germany, the UK or Sweden.3
A contract migration is a temporary migration where the migrant lives in the host country
for a limited number of years, and where the length of the migration is exogenously determined
by for instance a residence permit, or a working contract. Labour migrations to Switzerland
for instance were predominantly designed to be contract migrations. Most migrations into oil-
producing countries in the Middle East from Asia, Europe, and other Middle East countries
are contract migrations.
Return migration is the type of migration one has usually in mind when referring to a
migration as being temporary. Return migration describes a situation where migrants return
to their country of origin by their own choice, often after a signi¯cant period abroad. Many
migrations to Europe over the last decades fall in this category.
This classi¯cation is incomplete, and migrations which we observe today take many addi-
tional forms. Di®erent combinations between the di®erent types are of course possible. For
instance, circulatory migrations are often contract migrations. Although simple, the above
classi¯cation serves convenient as providing a framework for the many types of migrations
that we observe. Below we will focus on one particular type of temporary migration: return
migration.
3 Temporary Migrations - Some Evidence
How important and how frequent are temporary migrations? Examples of migrations where
the migrant chooses the return time (in our de¯nition "return migrations") are labor migra-
3Transient migrations are often referred to as chain migrations.
3tion to Central Europe between 1955 and 1973. Many of these migrants returned back to
their home countries. For example, BÄ ohning (1987, p.147) estimates that "more than two
thirds of the foreign workers admitted to the Federal Republic [of Germany], and more than
four ¯fth in the case of Switzerland, have returned". Glytsos (1988) reports that of the 1
million Greeks migrating to West Germany between 1960 and 1984, 85% gradually returned
home. Dustmann (1996) provides additional detail of return behavior of migrant workers
to Germany. Return migration is also important for the United States (see Piore (1979)).
Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) report that between 1908 and 1957 about 15.7 million persons
immigrated to the United States and about 4.8 million aliens emigrated. They found that
between 20% and 50% of legal immigrants (depending on the nationality) re-emigrated from
the United States in the 1970's. Warren and Peck (1980) estimate that about one third of
legal immigrants to the United States re-emigrated in the 1960's.
One di±culty with return migrations is its measurement. While many countries have
registration procedures in place that allow assessment of the number of incoming immigrants,
estimation of out°ows of immigrants is less straightforward. There are typically no procedures
in place that register immigrants who leave a country.
One way to assess the degree of out-migration is to use Census or Survey information that
records the year of arrival. Suppose for instance that a representative data-set is available
that records foreign born status of individuals as well as (for foreign born individuals) the
year of arrival. Then one could in principle construct for each year the percentage of foreign
born workers that arrived at a particular date within the survey window, and that are still
in the host country after a given number of years.4
To obtain some indication about the temporary character of immigration to the UK, we
follow this procedure and use the British Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the period between
1992 and 2004. The LFS is a survey of private households living in Great Britain. Since the
spring quarter 1992 the survey is conducted each quarter and changed to a rotating panel,
with individuals included in ¯ve consecutive waves of the survey. The LFS reports for foreign
born individuals the year of arrival.
4Rendall and Ball 2004 follow a similar procedure. They also provide projections on return migration based
on the International Passenger Survey. Although they use a di®erent breakdown, their numbers are in line
with ours.
4We select a sample of foreign born individuals who report ¯rst arrival in 1992 or after. To
avoid individuals who came as children or students, we restrict our sample to those whose age
at ¯rst arrival is 25 years or older. For each arrival cohort, we then construct a measure of
the percentage of individuals who are still in the country after up to 10 years. We exclude the
year of arrival for our calculations as there may be problems for the LFS to pick up individuals
who have just arrived, or arrival may have been before the survey date in a particular year.
Our reference year is thus the ¯rst year after arrival. This may result in an underestimate of
the extent of return migration, as we do not capture migrations which last less than 1 year.
For each arrival cohort, we then measure the (weighted) number of foreign born individuals
in Britain in 1993, 1994, etc., and compute the fraction of individuals still resident in year
2,3 up to 10 years after arrival, where, as said above, year 1 after arrival serves as base year.
We average these fractions for arrival cohorts 1992-2002 to avoid the problem of small sample
sizes.
Although this procedure should in principle give us some indication of the degree of return
migration, there are multiple sources of error. First, the sample size of the accumulated
samples for each year in the LFS changes slightly. Although we weight our observations with
population weights, the construction of weights in the LFS does not use immigrant status, so
that we may not be able to precisely counteract possible °uctuations in the size of the LFS
over the years. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the years since arrival measures the
year of ¯rst arrival. It is not unlikely that many foreign born individuals leave Britain again
for some time, and then return some years later. If this pattern is not symmetric over the
years since arrival distribution, then this may lead to °uctuation in our survival measure.
There are other problems that may a®ect our estimates, like possible di®erential non-response
of immigrants. Despite these shortcomings, this exercise should give some interesting insight
into return migration patterns for di®erent immigrant populations in Britain.
Below we will distinguish between males and females, as well as between immigrants of
di®erent origin and ethnicity. In particular we distinguish between four groups: Immigrants
from Europe, the Americas, and Australasia; immigrants from Africa; immigrants from the
Indian Sub-Continent; and immigrants from the Middle-East, the reminder of Asia, and other
countries. Further, we distinguish between White and Ethnic Minority immigrants.
In table 1 we display the total number of individuals of each of theses origin groups and
5their percentages 1 year after arrival in the UK. These numbers can be interpreted as a
breakdown of the origin composition of new immigrant arrivals in the UK.
The largest group are immigrants from Europe, the Americas, and Austral-Asia, with 1 in
2 new arrivals coming from these origins. Nine in ten immigrants in this category are white.
About 18 percent of new arrivals are from the African Continent. Interestingly, about half of
these immigrants are white. These could be from South-Africa, but also from countries where
white Africans su®ered persecution, like Zimbabwe. About 12 percent of immigrant arrivals
are from the Indian Sub-Continent, who classify themselves nearly exclusively as non-white.
Finally, about 20 percent of new arrivals are from the Middle-East, the Reminder of Africa,
and other countries - with more than 90 percent in this group being non-white.
Table 1: Foreign Born Composition 1 year after Arrival
All Non-White White
N. Obs Percent N. Obs Percent N.Obs Percent
Europe, Americas, Australasia 5,550 50.74 528 10.41 5,022 50.74
Africa 1,956 17.88 1,309 25.81 647 17.88
Indian Sub-Continent 1,263 11.55 1,251 24.67 12 11.55
Middle-East, Reminder of Asia, Other Countries 2,170 19.84 1,983 39.10 187 19.84
Total 10,939 100.00 5,071 100.00 5,868 100.00
Source: LFS, 1992-2004. Males and Females, Arrival Age 25 and above.
In Figure 2, we display the survival rate of immigrants in Britain from the ¯rst year after
arrival until up to ten years after arrival. We distinguish in these ¯gures between males
(solid line) and females (dashed line). In the left panel, we average over all arrival cohorts,
as explained above. In the right panel, we consider only arrival cohorts between 1992-1994.
The graphs suggest that there is a substantial reduction in each entry cohort over time,
and the patterns are similar when we use all entry cohorts, or only those between 1992 and
1994. If we interpret this as return migration, then the largest re-migration takes place over
the ¯rst 5 years after arrival. Considering all entry cohorts, only about 60 percent of male and
68 percent of female foreign born are still in Britain, compared to the population in the ¯rst
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Figure 2: Migrant Survival, by Gender
of return migration, as we do not capture short migrations which do not last longer than a
year. After ¯ve years the pattern seems to stabilise. The arrival cohort drops only slightly
in size over the next ¯ve years. Overall, the extent of re-migration seems to be similar for
males and females, in particular over the ¯rst 3-4 years; afterwards, females have a slightly
lower propensity to leave Britain.
In Figure 3 we pool males and females, but distinguish between origin (left panel) and
ethnicity (right panel), where we use the classi¯cations discussed above. These ¯gures suggest
substantial variation in return propensities across immigrants from di®erent origin countries.
While re-migration for immigrants from Europe, the Americas, and Austral-Asia as well
as the Middle East, other Asia, and other countries is substantial (more than 45 percent
have returned after 5 years after arrival, compared to those who are still there after year
1), and seems to continue after 5 years, return migration for the other two groups is much
less pronounced. There is little indication of any return for immigrants from Africa and the
Indian Continent.
The graphs in the right panel pool again males and females, but distinguish between
white and non-white immigrants. Again, there are substantial di®erences between these two
groups, with white immigrants having a much higher propensity to return than non-white
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Figure 3: Migrant Survival, by Origin and Ethnicity
one year after arrival are still around, with a further decrease to about 40 percent after 10
years. In contrast, the corresponding number for non-whites is about 85 percent after 5 years,
decreasing to around 80 percent after 10 years.
These numbers suggest that return migration is quite substantial. Note again that our
numbers may underestimate the degree of out-migration, as we are not able to obtain reliable
estimates for the number of immigrants in the arrival year, and therefore use year 1 after
arrival as the base year. If out-migration during the ¯rst year is as substantial as during the
second year, then (and considering all immigrants as in the left panel of ¯gure 1) more than
half of all immigrants arriving in the UK will have left the country after 6 years. Interesting
is also the substantial heterogeneity of out-migration according to origin, and to ethnicity.
An interesting question is now who leaves the country, and who stays. Is out-migration
positively or negatively selective? This will have important consequences for the overall
contribution of immigrants to the British economy; selective out-migration will also a®ect
the estimation of performance measures, like immigrant assimilation, in straightforward re-
gressions like in the literature we discuss above. Ideally, we would want to measure the
characteristics of individuals who leave the country after some years, and compare these with
those who stay. Unfortunately, we do not follow individuals in our data. However, we can
compare average characteristics of entry cohorts of individuals who are observed at di®erent
8points after arrival. Characteristics that do not change over time, or change in a systematic
manner (like e.g. age) allow assessment of who leaves, and should reveal something about
the change in the composition of the immigrant population. Characteristics that may change
over the migration cycle do not allow to allocate these changes to selective out-migration, or
to adaptation.
In table 2 we display a number of characteristics for the arrival cohorts 1992-1994, where
we consider those still resident at 1, 5, and 10 years after arrival. In the ¯rst three rows, we
display the average age, the average age at arrival, and the age at which the individual reports
to have ¯nished full - time education. Given that we consider only individuals who came to
Britain at an age older than 25, changes in characteristics (like education) between years may
suggest changes in the composition in the immigrant population due to out-migration. In the
next ¯ve rows we display the fraction employed, and the occupational distribution of those
who are in work. We classify occupations into high, intermediate and low skilled, as well as
farmers or farm workers (which is a very small group), and workers who are employed on
their own account (which may include self-employment). We categorise workers into the three
occupation categories by ¯rst estimating wage regressions for all workers (including the native
born) in the LFS over this period, and then allocating occupations to three classes of equal
size, according to their rank in the distribution of average wages within these occupations.
In the table we distinguish between males (upper panel) and females (lower panel). We
¯rst discuss the white male foreign born. Comparing those who are in the UK 1 year after
arrival, 5 years and 10 years after arrival, it seems that average age is increasing to a lesser
extent over the ¯rst ¯ve year than what we would expect if re-migration would be random
along the age distribution, which suggests that relatively more older workers leave during the
¯rst ¯ve years; however, over the ¯rst 10 years, selection according to age seems to be less
pronounced. The ¯gure also indicates that more educated individuals leave relatively early,
with the average number of years of schooling received dropping by about 1 year over the
¯rst half decade.
The next rows in the table look at employment probabilities and occupations, which we
classify as explained above. The reported occupational distributions are conditional on being
employed. The percentage of individuals in employment increases slightly, from about 73
percent to 79 percent over the ¯rst ¯ve years.
9Interesting are the ¯gures that classify individuals into di®erent occupation groups. Here
it seems that, while about 42 percent of white immigrants are classi¯ed in high skilled oc-
cupations, this percentage drops to 26 percent after 10 years, where most of the reduction
seems to take place during the second half of the decade after arrival. As we would expect
that immigrants improve their occupational position over their migration cycle, this suggests
out-migration that favours those in the upper part of the skill distribution. On the other
hand, the percentage of those in the intermediate category increases slightly, while those
classi¯ed as low skilled remain roughly stable. The last row reports numbers on farmers and
own account workers. Farmers or farm workers constitute only a very small fraction of this
category; it is own account workers which increase substantially over the decade, and roughly
in a linear manner. It may well be possible therefore that some of the drop in highly skilled
workers is explained by this increase.
The ¯gures for non-whites are reported in the right panel of the table. Again, we ¯rst
discuss males. The average age after 10 years is about 3 years lower than what we would
expect based on a random selection, which suggests that there is some tendency for individuals
above the mean age to leave the country; this selection on age is slightly more pronounced
than for white immigrants, despite the lower overall return propensity (see ¯gure 3). The
drop in education is likewise larger than for whites, with average age at which education has
been concluded being 2 years lower after 10 years.
The increase in employment probabilities is quite dramatic for this group: It increases
from 47 percent after 1 year to 67 percent after 5 years to 73 percent after 10 years. This
is compatible with adaptation of individuals to the UK labour market, but selective out-
migration may well lead these numbers to be either smaller or larger than what pure adap-
tation may induce. Turning to occupational allocations for those who are in employment,
we ¯nd that, other than for white immigrants, the percentage of those classi¯ed as being in
highly skilled occupations drops only slightly; however, the percentage of those with inter-
mediate skills increases sharply. Again, this trend may be due to selective out-migration,
selection into employment, or adaptation - in the absence of panel data, we are not able to
distinguish between these three processes.
10Table 2: Composition Immigrant Population 1, 5, and 10 years after Arrival
White Non-White
1 year 5 years 10 years 1 year 5 years 10 years
Males
Age 34.69 36.15 43.45 34.53 37.34 41.73
Age ¯nished Schooling 21.76 20.93 20.20 21.79 20.43 19.17
Age at Arrival 33.69 31.15 33.45 33.53 32.34 31.73
Employed 72.91 79.43 80.00 46.63 67.43 73.40
Occ. High Skilled 41.09 40.65 26.20 24.29 22.60 22.84
Occ. Inter Skilled 14.96 17.28 20.00 8.89 19.54 22.47
Occ. Low Skilled 7.76 11.68 08.96 9.76 20.30 13.85
Farmers, Own Account Workers 0.56 6.54 14.48 0.86 2.68 11.98
Females
Age 33.85 37.36 42.34 35.05 37.50 42.01
Age ¯nished Schooling 20.93 20.15 21.08 20.32 19.85 18.42
Age at Arrival 32.85 32.36 32.34 34.05 32.50 32.01
Employed 42.61 56.47 62.68 19.49 35.40 39.45
Occ. High Skilled 09.73 17.26 15.9 3.14 8.38 2.38
Occ. Inter Skilled 23.65 25.89 34.8 8.38 12.42 20.06
Occ. Low Skilled 6.20 11.51 6.46 6.28 13.97 15.30
Farmers, Own Account Workers 0.83 1.07 1.99 0.00 0.62 0.68
Source: LFS, 1992-2004. Males and Females, Arrival Age 25 and above, Arrival Cohorts
1992-1994.
114 Why do Migrants Return?
Above we have illustrated that return migrations are frequent. We will now address the
question as to what induces an immigrant to return. For that purpose, we will start with a
very simple model. The idea is as follows. Suppose the immigrant weights in each period
the bene¯ts of remaining a further unit of time abroad against the costs of doing so. He/she
will then decide to return home when the bene¯ts of staying abroad are lower than the cost.
When does this situation occur? The most important reason for emigration are higher wages
in the host economy. This creates additional wealth, and allows the migrant to increase
lifetime consumption. However, as the marginal utility of wealth decreases, the additional
bene¯t of a unit of time in the host country is the lower, the longer the migrant has already
stayed abroad (and the more wealth he/she has accumulated). Accordingly, the bene¯t of
migration slowly decreases. This alone does not trigger a return migration, since, whatever
the immigrant's wealth, it is always advantageous to remain a further unit in a country that
pays a higher wage.
One simple way to model a return migration is to assume that migrants have a prefer-
ence for consumption in their home country. In such a setting, migrants emigrate, because
that increases their lifetime wealth (and, therefore, their lifetime consumption). At the same
time, consumption abroad creates less pleasure than consumption at home. Under plausible
assumptions, it is straightforward to show within this model that bene¯ts of migration de-
crease over the migration cycle, while costs are positive, and may increase. This may lead
eventually to a return migration. Below we provide a more formal discussion.
No migration, and permanent migration are special cases of this model. For a migration
to take place, bene¯ts must initially be higher than costs. Accordingly, if, despite a large
wage di®erential, preferences for consumption in the home country (relative to the host
country) are strong, no migration will take place. Permanent migration occurs if at the end
of the migrant's lifetime, bene¯ts are still higher than costs. Again, this may depend on
the preference of the immigrant for home country consumption. Permanent migrations are
therefore a special case of return migrations - they occur when, over an immigrant's lifetime,
the bene¯ts of migration (here induced by higher wages) are always larger than the costs
(here induced by di®erences in preferences for consumption).
12Locational preferences are only one possible motive which triggers a return migration.
There are other reasons for why migrants may return, despite a persistently more favourable
economic situation in the home country.5 One reason which induces a re-migration is a higher
purchasing power of the host country currency in the home country. Migration is temporary
because it allows the migrant to take advantage of high wages abroad, and low prices at
home.
A further reason for a return relies solely on human capital considerations. If the return
on human capital acquired in the host country is higher at home, then this alone may trigger
a re-migration. One situation where this return motive is important are student migrations.
Another situation is migration from countries which are in the process of industrialization.
Basic knowledge about work e±ciency, organization at the work place etc., acquired in the
industrialized country increases the migrant's productivity only slightly in the host country,
but may be important and highly valued in the home country.
Return Migration and Optimal Migration Duration
We will now provide a slightly more formal discussion of these three motives for a return
migration (see Dustmann 2003 for a similar model). We will for simplicity consider only the
case where a potential migrant has two choices: First, whether or not to emigrate. Second,
whether or not to return back to the home country. For simplicity, we only consider the
productive life of an individual, and assume that the individual will continue working after
return. Our framework is easily extended to the case where the migrant does not only
decide about a return but also about possible activities after return in the home country (see
Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002). We will also neglect uncertainty about future wages, and
assume a world of perfect foresight. Furthermore, we will neglect any cost of migration.
In what follows, we will use superindices E for wages and consumption in the Emigration
country (or source country) and I for the Immigration country (or host country). In our
model, time t is continuous. The migrant is o®ered the option to migrate at time t = 0,
and he/she dies at time t = T. For simplicity, we assume that he/she works until the end
5See Dustmann (2001) for a general framework for investigating return migration and
optimal migration durations. In Dustmann (1997), return migration and optimal migration
durations are analysed in a stochastic environment.
13of life, either in the immigration- or in the emigration country. Should the migrant decide
to emigrate, he chooses whether or not to return, as well as the duration of time in the
immigration country, jointly with the optimal °ows of consumption at home and abroad, cE
and cI. Wages in home- and host country are denoted by wI and wE(h) respectively. Here h
is the time of duration in the immigration country, and wI > wE(0) and wE(h) is increasing
and concave in h. These assumptions imply that, at t = 0, wages in the host country are
higher than wages in the home country; further, the migrant's wage in the home country
increases with time abroad h. This re°ects in the simplest possible way the possibility that
time spent abroad leads to improvement in skills that are of value in the home country. For
simplicity, we assume that the wage the migrant receives in the host country remains constant
throughout.
To simplify the analysis, there is no discounting in our model. The migrant's lifetime
utility function is given by





is the migrant's utility function and and the parameter ® governs the rate at which marginal
utility declines with consumption. We assume that ® < 1: The parameter » represents the
migrant's preference regarding the location at which consumption takes place. We shall
assume further that » > 1 so that for the same level of consumption in the two countries the
immigrant has a higher level of utility and a higher marginal utility if he/she consumes in
the home country.
The migrant maximizes (1) with respect to cE, cI, and h, subject to the life-time budget
constraint
hcI + (T ¡ h)pcE = hwI + (T ¡ h)wE(h) ´ Y (h); (2)
where Y (h)is life time income and p is the price of consumption in the home country,
relative to the host country. If p < 1, consumption abroad is more costly than consumption
14at home. Accordingly, 1=p is the purchasing power of host country currency in the source
country. Within this simple setting, re-migration may occur for three reasons: First, a higher
preference for consumption at home (» > 1). Second, a higher purchasing power of the host
country currency at home (p < 1). And third, because time abroad improves the migrant's
earnings capacity at home (
dwE(h)
dh > 0).
The maximization can be solved in two stages: the immigrant ¯rst chooses a time of de-
parture and then, conditioned on this choice, and the resulting life time income, consumption
levels are chosen. Consumption in the second stage must satisfy the condition that there is






It is seen that the immigrant always consumes more when henshe goes back to the home
country, because the marginal utility of consumption there is higher and consumption costs
less. For the utility function used here, condition (3) implies that cE = ·cI, where · is a
constant that depends on the parameters ®; p;» such that p· > » ¸ 1:
Condition (3) together with the budget constraint (2) determine the levels of consumption
for a given h:
cI(h) =
Y (h)




h + (T ¡ h)p·
:
It is seen that, because p· > 1; cE and cI must both rise with h if life time income Y (h)
rises with h. That is, if




By assumption, life time income rises initially because the initial wage of the immigrant
is higher in the host country than in the home country (that is wI ¡ wE(0) > 0) and time
abroad improves the migrant's earnings capacity at home (
dwE(h)
dh > 0). But, because staying
in the host country raises the wage in the home country, it is possible for life time wealth to
decreases in h after the immigrant has spent su±cient time in the host country for the wage
at home to exceed the wage in the host country ( wE(h) > wI):
15We can now turn to the determination of the optimal departure date h: Di®erentiating
life time utility with respect to h; and using the results above one obtains6
dJ
dh
´ ¡(h) = ®[v(cI(h)) ¡ »v(cE(h))] + v0(cI(h))Y 0(h): (6)
We can see that h a®ects the immigrant's life time utility in two ways: A postponement of the
departure time entails a loss of the higher utility which is attainable upon returning home.
This loss is represented by the term ®[v(cI(h)) ¡ »v(cE(h))]: But there is also a potential
gain, if staying longer in the host country raises life time earnings. This potential gain is
represented by the term v0(cI(h))Y 0(h): An important feature of our model is that as long as
staying in the home country increases life time wealth the incentive to postpone the return
date declines. That is, Y 0(h) > 0 ) ¡0(h) < 0: The basic reason is that increased wealth
reduces the marginal utility from additional wealth and raises the cost of delay in term of
forgone consumption in the home country 7
If there is an interior solution for the optimal time of departure, h¤; such that 0 < h¤ < T,
then it is necessary that ¡(h¤) = 0 and ¡0(h¤) < 0: Otherwise, the immigrant would either
postpone the departure time or leave earlier. Now, because the cost of delay is always positive,
an interior solution that satis¯es ¡(h¤) = 0 implies that at the optimal time of departure, h¤;
life time wealth must be increasing (i.e., Y 0(h¤) > 0). In other words, the immigrant leaves
(if at all) before hisnher life time wealth reached the maximal value. It then follows that a
slight delay in the departure date beyond h¤ must increase the utility loss and decrease the
utility gain. That is, ¡(h¤) = 0 ) ¡0(h¤) < 0 which implies that if an interior solution exists
it must be unique.
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dh < 0 and the term v
0(c
I(h))Y




dh < 0 and, by
assumption Y
00(h) < 0:
16The model nests the two situations of a permanent, and no migration: Migration is
permanent if the di®erence in costs and bene¯t is positive for h ! T: This case occurs if there
is is, indi®erence between consumption abroad and at home, equal purchasing power, and no
e®ect of time abroad on migrants' earnings potential at home. Then, over the migrant's life
cycle, he/she will always ¯nd an additional unit of time in the host country creating a higher
marginal utility than if this time was spent abroad and, therefore, the immigrant will never
return. Migration never occurs if the di®erence in bene¯t and cost it is negative for h ! 0.
This may be the case, for instance, if the wage di®erential is small and individuals have a
high preference for consumption at home.
Now consider three scenarios which may all lead to a return migration.
Case 1: Preferences for consumption in the home country, » > 1, p = 1, wE(h) = wE <
wI: In this case, life time wealth always rises in h (that is Y 0 (h) > 0 for all h). Therefore, the
di®erence in the bene¯t and cost of being abroad decreases over the migration cycle (that is
¡0(h) < 0 for all h): This is due to decreasing utility of wealth, which makes each unit of time
in the host country more costly in terms of forgone consumption at home. Re-migration takes
place when the bene¯t is equal to the cost. Whether this or a corner solution occurs, depends
on the relative preference for consumption at home, and the size of the wage di®erential. In
the limit, for a very large preference for consumption at home, migration will not occur
(because ¡(0) < 0 and thus ¡(h) < 0 for all h): If, on the other hand , the wage in the host
country grows very fast relative to the home country wage, migration will become permanent
(that ¡(h) > 0 for all h). In the intermediate case we shall have ¡(0) > 0 and ¡(T) < 0
so that a unique interior solution h¤ exists, whereby the person migrates, then stays in the
host country a period h¤ and then goes back to the home country. Obviously, changes in
these parameters a®ect (in case of an interior solution) the length of the migration duration.8
Finally, this return motive creates a target-saving behaviour in case of an interior solution,
with immigrants saving while in the host country, and de-saving after return.
Case 2: Lower purchasing power in the home country, » = 1, p < 1, wE(h) = wE < wI:
8Dustmann (2003) shows that in a similar model, an increase in host country wages induces both an income
e®ect and a relative wage e®ect; while the latter will always lead to an increase in the migration duration, the
former leads to a decrease, as the value of staying abroad decreases with lifetime income. The total e®ect of
an increase in host country wages on the total migration duration may be positive or negative.
17In this case too, Y 0 (h) > 0 and ¡0(h) < 0 for all h so that the formal analysis is the same.
However, the reason for a return migration is motivated by higher wages in host country
and lower costs of consumption in the home country. Since wages are higher in immigration
countries, non-traded goods and services tend to be more expensive in host- than in home
countries. Furthermore, migrants often exhibit di®erent consumption habits than natives,
which may be due to cultural or religious di®erences. They may demand goods which need
to be imported, and are accordingly more expensive. A higher purchasing power of the host
country currency in the migrant's home country leads to a lower consumption abroad, and
higher consumption at home.
Case 3: Accumulation of human capital that is applicable at home, » = 1, p = 1,
wE(0) < wl and wE(h) increasing and concave. In contrast to the previous two cases, the
"cost" of migration is now equal to zero, since equal preferences for consumption and the
same purchasing power leads to indi®erence between consumption in the home- and host
country (the ¯rst term in (6) is equal to zero). The only motivation for immigration is to
increase life time wealth. Given our assumption, the immigrant always gains initially by
staying in the host country, because of the initial wage di®erential. However, the immigrant
will leave at the point at which life time wealth is maximized. If this point is achieved within
the migrant's lifetime, he/she will return home at time h¤ at which Y 0 (h¤) = 0: Otherwise,
he/she will stay in the host country forever. An immediate implication is that if the impact
on wages in the home country is su±ciently strong, so that wE(T) > wI, the immigrant will
always return to the home country after having migrated to the host country. Thus migration
and re-migration may occur because of the initially negative wage di®erential combines with
a positive impact of experience acquired abroad on wages at home. Migration in this case is
purely an investment decision, and solely triggered by the future return to human capital.
Combinations of the di®erent scenarios may now serve to describe speci¯c types of mi-
gration. For instance, student migrations are frequently characterized by a negative wage
di®erential (consisting of forgone earnings in the home country, and possibly negative earn-
ings abroad (fees etc.)). However, migration occurs if the return to human capital acquired
abroad is su±ciently large over the remaining time in the home country.
185 Introducing Heterogeneity
In our simple model above, we have not drawn distinction between di®erent types of individ-
uals. All immigrants face exactly the same wages in immigration- and emigration country.
However, many problems in the economics of migration arise from heterogeneity and how
it relates to the initial migration decision, as well as to return migration. For instance, an
important question is whether immigrants are positively or negatively selected, in comparison
to the native born population. As pointed out by Borjas (1985), selection can lead to cohort
e®ects in for instance simple earnings models. Also, if return migration is substantial (as our
¯gures above suggest for the UK) then it is important to understand whether it is selective
and in which direction.
We will now consider a simple framework that extends our discussion to the case where
there is heterogeneity across immigrants. This discussion draws on Rubinstein and Weiss
(2006).9 Consider two countries, a potential emigration country (E) and a potential immi-
gration country (country I). We assume that individuals possess two di®erent skills (say skill
1 and skill 2) and that the overall earning capacity of a worker in each of the two countries is
a weighted average of their two skill endowments, where the weight of skill 1 is larger in the
receiving country while the weight of skill 2 is larger in the source country. The model allows
for human capital accumulation through learning by doing. In each country, a worker can
augment both skills via a process of learning by doing but at di®erent rates; skill 1 (the skill
which is more valuable in the receiving country) accumulates at a faster rate than skill 2 in
country E and the converse holds in country I. Thus, the two countries di®er in the learning
opportunities that they provide as well as in the productive contribution of the two skills.
Finally, we recognize that for various reasons, such as frictions and informational de¯ciencies
on the side of employers and immigrants, it is unlikely that when workers move from the
country of origin to the receiving country their skills can be immediately put into their most
productive use. Instead, immigrants undergo an adaptation process, whereby the wages that
they receive for their skills in the host country rise gradually as a function of the time spent
in the host country.
This framework allows us to study migration- and re-migration decisions, as well as issues
9Details and formal analysis are provided in an Appendix available from the authors upon request.
19of selection into, and out of the immigration country. Re-migration in this framework is
created by a process which is similar to the human capital motive we have discussed above.
We can de¯ne two di®erent situations of transferability of human capital, which we refer to
as "partial transferability" and "super transferability". Under partial transferability, work
experience in any country has a larger impact on the accumulation of local than of foreign
human capital. In contrast, under super transferability, work experience acquired in one
country has a larger impact on the accumulation of foreign than local human capital - this
is in nature not dissimilar to our human capital motive above. It can be shown that if work
experience is partially transferable, then any potential migrant who wishes to migrate from
country E to country I will aim to do so as early in the life cycle as possible. Furthermore,
migration decisions will not be reversed, i.e. migration decisions will be permanent. If work
experience is super transferable, migrations will again take place as early in the life cycle as
possible, but there will be a return migration after a ¯nite period of time. The reason is
similar to the return motive we discussed above: under super-transferability, the migrant will
accumulate skills that are more productive in the home country at a faster rate than in the
home country, so that ¯nally his/her earnings potential is higher back home, despite a higher
rate of return in the receiving country.
[Figure 4 about here]
Turning now to the question who will migrate and who will return, we commence again
with the case of partial transferability. In ¯gure 4 we explain the implications the model
has for selection. Remember that there are two skills in the model, skill 1 (which is more
productive in the receiving country) and skill 2 (which is more productive in the sending
country). Let us measure endowments of skill 2 on the horizontal axis and endowments of
skill 1 on the vertical axis in Figure 4. Then skill endowments of each worker are represented
by a point in this graph. For simplicity assume that individuals are equally distributed
on this space and that the distributions of skills in the two countries are the same. The
thin line in Figure 4 is the 45 degree line, separating the plane into two regions; above this
line we ¯nd workers who have a relatively larger endowment of skill 1 and below the line
we ¯nd workers with a relatively larger amount of skill 2. The solid line in Figure 4 also
distinguishes two regions; all individuals with skill endowments above this line will emigrate
while all those with skill endowments below it will we stay in the country of origin. As
20seen, the proportion of workers with skill 1 (which suits country E) is higher among the
migrants than among the non-migrants. Under the assumption of identical skill distributions
in the two countries, it also follows that immigrants will have a higher endowment of skill
1 than natives of the receiving country. This selection process may explain why immigrants
sometime overtake natives in terms of wages. This e®ect is even stronger if we consider the
case of super transferability, because then the immigrants who choose to return among those
who emigrated have relatively high endowment of skill 2 which suits country 2; leaving behind
those with even higher endowment of skill 1.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we discuss migrations that are temporary. We illustrate that temporary migra-
tions are frequent. We provide evidence for this for the UK: Our data suggests that, taking
the population of immigrants who are still in the country one year after arrival as the base,
about 40 percent of all males and 55 percent of all females have left Britain 5 years later.
Our ¯gures suggest that return migration is particularly pronounced for the group of immi-
grants from the EU, the Americas and Australia/New Zealand; it is much less pronounced
for immigrants from the Indian continent and from Africa. Distinguishing between white and
non-white immigrants, our numbers suggest that white immigrants have substantially higher
return propensities than non-white immigrants.
We then address the question why immigrants should return. We provide some answers
to this question within the simplest possible model, and show that return migration may be
triggered either by higher preferences for consumption in the home country, or high purchasing
power of the host country currency in the migrant's home country, or by accumulation of
human capital in the host country in a learning by doing way that improves productivity
back home. We show that each of these reasons may lead to a return.
We then extend our argument by introducing heterogeneity of immigrants in terms of
their skills. This allows us to study selective in-migration, as well as selective outmigration.
We have shown that this selection works to generate an immigrant population in the receiving
country that has a relatively large endowment of skill 1 (the skill which is more valuable in
the immigration country) which is the reason why they choose to enter or stay in the receiv-
21ing country. Therefore, wage comparison between natives and immigrants in the receiving
country are biased in favor of immigrants, which may be one possible reason why immigrants
sometime overtake natives in terms of wages.10
What consequences have temporary migrations (as opposed to permanent migrations)
for the economic analysis of immigration? A large area in the economics of immigration is
concerned with understanding the way immigrants perform in the host country labour mar-
ket over their life cycle. Typically, this literature assumes that migrations are permanent,
and estimates Mincer type earnings functions for immigrants as well as natives, using the
time an immigrant is resident in the destination country as a measure for the accumula-
tion of residence-country speci¯c human capital. If migrations are non-permanent however,
the "years since migration" measure may relate to di®erent populations, with di®erent com-
positions in observed and unobserved characteristics, except if return migration is random.
This induces bias in estimation that is not dissimilar to that of estimates of tenure e®ects
in straightforward regressions. As our analysis in section 2 demonstrates, the sample of im-
migrants still in the UK after 10 years is di®erent in terms of age and education than the
sample of immigrants after 1 year, which may suggest that out-migration is indeed selective.
We have taken this up again in our theoretical discussion, where we demonstrate that, within
the particular model we discuss, those who remain in the host country are those who have
more skills that are usable there. Therefore, if out-migration is selective, estimates of immi-
grants' performance pro¯les will be biased, through an over-estimate or an under-estimate of
the e®ect of the years of residence measure.
Return migration may introduce other types of heterogeneity into immigrant behavior
which we have not addressed in this paper. Apart from being selective, return migration may
lead to variation in the incentive structure di®erent immigrants (with di®erent return plans)
face, and also lead to heterogeneity between immigrants and otherwise identical natives. The
reason is that immigrants who have only temporary intentions to remain in the host country
will take into account economic conditions in their home countries after return when making
10However, Eckstein and Weiss (2004) show that even without such a bias it is likely that immigrants will
invest at higher intensity than natives due to a gradual adoption of skills to the host country. Speci¯cally, the
opportunity cost are initially low because skills are under utilized but the future returns are relatively high
because with time job matching improves.
22economic decisions in the host country, like labour supply decisions, saving decisions, and
decisions about investment into human capital.
The relatively large proportion of immigrants that leave again after the ¯rst ¯ve years of
in-migration is unlikely to be a particular feature of Britain. Also, the substantial hetero-
geneity across di®erent immigrant groups is not likely to be a particularity for Britain, and
similar patterns are likely in other countries. Given the large potential bias that selective
out-migration may induce it is most likely that much of the existing analysis of immigrant
behaviour and performance changes, perhaps radically, if we had additional information on
return migration. Furthermore, even if out-migration was random, di®erences in behaviour
induced by return plans are an additional source of bias. It seems to us that appropriate
assessment of immigrant performance has to take into account return migration and its pos-
sible e®ects on estimation; otherwise we may rely on possibly greatly distorted assessments
of immigrant performance in host economies.
As we have emphasized, return migration also a®ects the performance of immigrants
when they go back home. Indeed, with a su±ciently high rate of return migration the source
country can actually gain from the opportunity that it's citizens have to acquire experience
abroad - which is quite the opposite of the usual brain drain argument. Example of this sort
could be the large number of young Israeli engineers who went to the US and the signi¯cant
proportion of them who returned to create a thriving IT industry in Israel.
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